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RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
ARCHIBALD COX
There are just two points that I shall address. First, I think that
Professors Tushnet and Brubaker both pointed to a confusion for
which I am at least, for tonight, partly responsible. When I referred
to the word "activism," I did use it to embrace two quite different
meanings.
One meaning is that of overruling majoritarian decisions-lack
of deference, if you will. The second meaning involves changing the
law from that written in the books, from that discoverable by read-
ing what Judge Learned Hand used to call "these books about us."
I associate the two because the more a judge substitutes his judg-
ment, or a Court substitutes its judgment, for that of the legislature,
the larger the judge's role and the more active the judge's role in
the total pattern of government.
Second, the more courts depart from the law in the books and
precedent to writing new rules, again, the more they enlarge their
roles as individuals in the government. What brings these events
together in my mind is that both tend to raise questions about the
judges' legitimacy. Specifically, each in its own way raises the ques-
tion whether judges are exceeding their function and thus in danger
of losing legitimacy. And, as I have said many times, that is a very
important consideration in my mind, because it is only that which
will make the courts Madison's bulwark against oppression.
In addition, I cannot resist saying just a word about the boy
who killed his parents who is said to have pleaded for mercy on the
ground that he was an orphan. I don't think that was the plea of this
little boy. I think the plea of this little boy was: While I killed my
parents, and now you've got the gun, please don't go around shoot-
ing all the sisters, cousins, uncles, and aunts. I know the cause of
killing people; I think what we should do is to stop doing it.
In other words, it seems to me that maybe those who defend
some, if not all, of the decisions of the Warren Court are not the
most persuasive voices calling for a low judicial profile and judicial
restraint in the future. But, on the other hand, they are entitled to
say: "Don't you go in your own way." Indeed, Professor Morgan
came back pretty close to this position in the end.
Lastly, I want to emphasize, lest we forget, how well the Court
has endured the passage of these 200 years. I spent so many days
170 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 47:169
sitting in the Supreme Court building before the Court, wondering
how those men-and now, those men and that woman-manage to
function at all with the range of extraordinarily difficult problems
that they deal with day after day. Really, the fact that they function
at all is an extraordinary tribute to both the institution and the Jus-
tices who sit, and have sat, upon it.
